Contrarily, this article analyses the category of 'failed states' as a discursive practice rather than as an explanation of some objective reality.
Therefore, it understands that the discourse on 'failed states' is not a description of an innocent world 'out there', since it participates in the production of this world (of sovereign states).
The first section clarifies the discourse analysis employed in the article. By analysing the discourse on 'failed states', the second section attempts to answer the following question: how does the discourse on state failure participate in the (re)production of the state as norm? The third section explores how 'failed states' are usually thought of as a temporal category. The fourth section argues that the 'failed state' discourse creates conditions for the possibility of interventionist practices-of state reconstruction-by supposedly 'benevolent' and 'temporally advanced' actors. The fifth section suggests that such discourse and the interventions it authorises participate in the production of the 'international' as a modern/progressive realm-thus contradicting its traditional conception as an anarchic realm of recurring conflicts. Finally, the sixth section explores how the internalization of the causes of conflicts in failed states works as a discursive practice, constructing these states as disconnected from a 'tolerant' and 'benevolent' international community. As I will try to indicate, failed states are seen as primarily responsible for the conflicts that take place within their borders.
A Discourse Analysis of "Failed States"
The analytical strategy adopted here, informed by post-structuralism, takes advantage of discourse analysis to understand the "reality". According to
Foucault, "reality" -subject, object and their relationships -only becomes intelligible through discourse, which means that "reality" cannot be understood in the absence of interpretation (see DOTY, 1993; MALMVIG, 2006) . As stated by Lene Hansen (2006) , language is a political act since it is always subjective and questionable (HANSEN, 2006) .
For Foucault (2004) , the "world" is produced by discursive practices. In this sense, the "world" does not have an ontological foundation but is, rather, a product of the power that operates through language. According to Foucault (2004) , there is no possibility of exercising power without a certain economy of discourses of truth; that is, power relations cannot be established without a certain production, accumulation and circulations of discourses of truth (FOUCAULT, 2004 ).
Thus, the "world" no longer can be seen as an empirical referent in which knowledge and truth shall meet and to which they shall refer (MALMVIG, 2006) .
Language is not conceived, as assumed by positivism, as a transparent instrument which serves as a conduit between thoughts/concepts and things (SHAPIRO, 1989) . To the extent that discourses do not refer to an essence or to a stable referent, but only to other discursive practices, any analysis of "reality" can claim the stamp of authenticity (BROWN, 1994) .
Since the discourse does not derive from an intention of a conscious actor, it does not function, as claimed by realist theorists, as merely a guise to advance interests. Differently, for Foucault (2004) , the subject itself is seen as a product of discourse and, therefore, that subject is not previous to the discourse. In the words of Foucault (2004) : "The individual (…) is not the vis-à-vis power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation" (FOUCAULT, 2004, pp. 183,184) . As Malmvig (2006) remarks, discursive articulations are not seen as rhetorical superficial phenomena, behind which we can find a real cause or an extra-discursive foundation, like interest or power. As shown by Doty, the central question for post-structuralist thinkers is not worded as a "why question", but rather formulated in terms of "how-possible".
According to Doty (1993) , questions formulated in such way have the power to analyse not only how social identities are constructed but also how certain policies have become possible. For Doty (1993) , such questions illuminate an aspect of power neglected by the "why questions": namely, the way in which power operates to construct particular modes of subjectivity and interpretative dispositions. This kind of power cannot be understood as one that pre-existing social actors possess and use. Rather, it produces a variety of meanings and imaginable behaviours and, as such, it is in Foucault's terms "productive". The power inherent in language is productive in that it produces the "world" and has practical effects, enabling and legitimizing certain actions while precluding and discrediting others (DOTY, 1993 Schmitt (1985) , according to whom "the exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves everything: it confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the exception" (SCHMITT, 1985, p.15) .
Post-structural thinkers understand the supposedly 'neutral' and 'factual' descriptions of failed states as exercises of power, since they work as productive practices of identity construction (see DOTY, 1996 is not a short-term phenomenon, but a cumulative, incremental process similar to a degenerative disease. Governments lose their ability to exercise legitimate authority unevenly over territory" (LYONS and SAMATAR, 1995, p. 01) . Robert Jackson (2000) , in turn, requests foreigners to be aware of the risks 'failed states' pose to their health. In his words, "some countries could accurately and legitimately be advertised by the following public notice posted on large signs at all border entrances: Warning: this country can be dangerous to your health" (JACKSON, 2000, p. 294) .
This representation of danger as illness works for keeping the purity and integrity of the state's 'self '. For Campbell (1992) , "it is the extent to which we want to organize the environment-the extent to which we want to purify our domain-that determines how likely it is that we represent danger in terms of dirt or disease" (CAMPBELL, 1992, p. 81 Nonetheless, the discourse on failed states precludes any serious interrogation on the failure of the state as a model, for what is at stake in this discourse is the ability of deviant states to adjust to the image of the 'successful state'-which, through this discourse, has its status of normality reaffirmed.
It is precisely this status of normality that Vivienne Jabri (2010) The above definitions preclude any serious attempt to consider alternative forms of political organization, since they condition us to think that, in the absence of states, all we have left is a Hobbesian state of anarchy. However, as remarked by Jean-German Gros (2003) , the contemporary legitimate state is not exactly the same as Weber's since today, in addition to security, the state must provide a wide range of services, from environmental protection to the redistribution of wealthfunctions that are not performed by 'failed states'. For Rotberg (2002) , this means that such functions are taken over by warlords and other non-state actors, once "the failed state is no longer able or willing to perform the job of a nation-state in the modern world" (ROTBERG, 2002, p. 87) . Failed states would be a 'dark mirror image' of functional states and those characterised by good governance, as they are often represented by their lack of transparency, human rights abuses, insufficient mechanisms of accountability and generalized corruption on the part of the ruling elites (BROOKS, 2005) .
'Failed states' and 'pre-modernity': the temporalisation of difference
In the failed state discussion, a number of categories and metaphors are used to represent difference as backwardness, creating a temporal distance between Europeans and non-Europeans that reproduces a pattern of the first encounters between Europeans and Amerindians (see BLANEY and INAYATULLAH, 2004) . These failed states are often allocated in a condition of a 'Hobbesian state of nature'-an environment that temporally precedes the social contract (see KAPLAN, 1994 In this way, both Cooper (2003) and Forrest (1994) inferiorise difference by interpreting it as backwardness. Difference as pre-modern identity is, therefore, delegitimised through a comparison-explicit or implicit-with temporally more advanced identities. According to Blaney and Inayatullah (2004) , "asserting one's identity as distinct from modernity-the moment of difference-risks internal fragmentation, limited material "progress" and, what follows, designation as an inferior or backward region (or, in more contemporary terms, the "quasi" or "failed states")" (BLANEY and INAYATULLAH, 2004, p. 114) .
Taking into account this temporalisation of difference, the discourse on 'failed states' produces the temporal identity of the so-called 'successful states'. In this sense, 'successful states' are not only able to guarantee security through the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, to provide public goods to their population, to respect democratic principles, to observe human rights, to ensure the efficient functioning of their administrative machine, to promote 'good governance', but they are also states that construct themselves as temporally advanced in relation to their 'failed' and 'backward' counterparts.
The effects of 'state failure'
The discourse on 'failed states' has political consequences, creating the conditions of possibility for increasingly intrusive interventions. These interventions are undertaken in the name of correcting this situation of failure and are driven by the promise to lead states toward more advanced stages of development.
Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (1992) For Gros (2003) , the inability to appreciate the specificities of failed states can thus lead to the adoption of wrong policies by the international community, making external actors more cautious against future intervention. In this sense, for the author, "this way of conceptualizing allows for distinguishing among states in terms of the severity of their failure and most importantly calibrating external intervention according to where states are on the continuum" (GROS, 2003, p. 457).
Along this line, it is important to note that in 2014 the annual Failed States
Index changed the terminology from "failed" to "fragile" states, precisely in order to reflect the "continuum of state development" suggesting that states are weak but can improve from their poor situation (PICKERING, 1994) . According to J.J.
Messner and Hendry (2014):
What the term 'failed State' itself fails to capture is that state failure or fragility really exists along a continuum: it's a continuum within a country, both geographically and also in different aspects of society. The continuum also exists over time, and the term 'failed' really suggests a certain degree of finality that really just isn't true. A country can be very weak, and it can recover. That may take some time, but it still doesn't mean that a state will ever be failed for all time (MESSNER and HENDRY, 2014) .
So, the introduction of the term 'fragility' reflects an attempt to 'capture a lot more of nuance' and, as such, of providing 'a lot more of an accurate description for the kind of analyses that we are attempting' (MESSNER and HENDRY, 2014 
Domestic anarchy versus international progress
By constructing states as 'backward' and incapable of changing their own histories, the discourse on 'failed states' also produces the 'international' as a realm of progress thereby contradicting its traditional characterization as anarchic and marked by recurrent conflicts. To develop this argument, the remainder of this article first analyses how the conventional Anglo-American literature conceives of International Relations; and then, investigates how the discourse on 'failed states' is reversing this logic although it still continues to operate on the same modern demarcation of boundaries between domestic and international.
In his article Why is there no International Theory?, Martin Wight (1966) identified the opposition between political theory, understood as the theory of the good life possible inside the state, and the theory of International Relations, characterised instead by a refutation of the Enlightenment view of progress.
According to Wight (1966) , International Relations is bound to be a counterpoint to something more authentic and political, namely, life within states. This clear demarcation of borders between life inside and outside of the political community was made possible by the principle of state sovereignty, which has circumscribed political and progressive life to territorially demarcated spaces (WALKER, 1993) .
In this sense, due to the anarchic nature of the international system and the impossibility of effective political life outside the borders of the state, Brooks Discourses on 'failed states' subvert the conventional theory of international relations in that, by representing such states as anarchical, they threaten to undermine the opposition between state sovereignty and international anarchy that demarcates an internal domain of order and civility from an external domain of violence, inhumanity and disorder (DOTY, 1996) . According to Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1982) , the Anglo-American conception of the international system (domestic order versus international discord) could not, in the 1980s, address the everyday reality of Africa. This region seemed to experience a reversal of the traditional logic, with the international realm being marked by concord and civility-a structure of rules and conventions governing relations among states-against an internal state of disorder and violence. Therefore, the authors conclude that "the recent national and international history of Black Africa challenges more than it supports some of the major postulations of international relations theory" (JACKSON and ROSBERG, 1982, p. 24) .
Before the end of the Cold War, Jackson (2000) introduced the concept of 'quasi-states' to refer to those states that came to enjoy legal sovereignty after
World War II, but could not practically perform the duties of a sovereign state efficiently, including the provision of security and well-being to their populations.
However, their failure was occluded during the Cold War because they enjoyed external recognition and had their sovereignty respected regardless of their domestic conditions. Thus, the high degree of tolerance by this 'benevolent' international society allowed these unprepared states to have their independence recognised. According to Jackson (2000) , "the external guarantee of legal independence is primarily owing to the emergence of a post-colonial international society that is highly tolerant of different degrees of statehood across the world" (JACKSON, 2000, p. 196) . After 1945, the international society became informed by a pluralist ethic, that is, an ethic primarily concerned with upholding international order and the sovereignty of independent states. In this context, "political laissez faire was adopted as the universal norm of international society" (JACKSON, 2000, p. 314) .
At the same time that the anarchical situation of these 'failed states' became more evident, the end of superpower rivalry and the growth of a normative consensus around liberal democratic values in the international realm contributed to the possibility of thinking in terms of the progress of that international realm. In this sense, the end of the Cold War enabled modernization to be seen as a global process (BLANEY and INAYATULLAH, 2004) . This image took 
It is the 'other's' fault
As 'others', the so-called 'failed states' need to be continuously contained to prevent domestic disorder/anarchy from spilling over and spoiling the progress of the 'international'-which, if it happened, could give validity to Brooks'(2005) idea of the 'international' as a major failed state (BROOKS, 2005) . Thus, the distinction between domestic and international politics, established by the discipline of International Relations, continues to inform the literature on state failure, even if the alleged threat has moved from the international to the domestic realm of 'failed states' (HILL, 2005) .
A common discursive strategy, used to draw a clear line discriminating 'failed states' from the international realm, consists of allocating the blame for their failure exclusively on domestic factors. The blame is, thus, on the 'failed states' themselves, as if their current problems did not refer back to global processes that have historically impinged on them. In this sense, the impact of colonial powers as well as that of superpower rivalry over these 'underdeveloped'
states has been increasingly neglected in the conventional literature, while the domestic dimensions of state failure are continuously emphasised.
According to Charbonneau (2009) By shifting the focus on the problem of disorder to the domestic domain, the international domain becomes the only place where a solution to the problem of 'failed states' can be found (BICKERTON, 2007, p. 102) .
In this sense, the discourse underlining the domestic roots of state failure is fundamentally silent about the global processes that contributed to such 'failure'.
Such historical amnesia, undertaken by the mainstream literature, unjustly places blame on the victims by associating African problems with internal factors, making it difficult to imagine that Africans themselves may be able to solve their own problems (CRAWFORD, 1996) .
Pierre Englebert (1997) and 'violent' remain fundamental to the existence of a 'progressive', ''liberal' and 'peaceful' West.
Accordingly, this article sought to show that the traditional image of an anarchical system versus an ordered and progressive state is turned on its head when viewed from the perspective of 'failed states'. In the latter, domestic anarchy
